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Summary
The United States, its allies, and local leaders have achieved substantial
successes in the Balkans since the mid-1990s.  The wars in the region have ended,
and all of the countries are undertaking political and economic reforms at home and
orienting their foreign policies toward Euro-Atlantic institutions.  However, difficult
challenges remain, including resolving issues of political status, especially the status
of Kosovo; breaking up the power of political-criminal groups; enforcing the rule of
law; bringing war criminals to justice; and reforming the economies of the region. 
 The current goal of the international community in the Balkans is to stabilize
the region in a way that is self-sustaining and does not require direct intervention by
NATO-led forces and international civilian officials.   Relatedly,  the United States
is seeking to reduce the costs of its commitments to the region, in part due to
competing U.S. and international priorities,  such as the war on terrorism, and efforts
to stabilize Iraq and Afghanistan, which have placed strains on U.S. resources.
SFOR and KFOR, the NATO-led peacekeeping force in Bosnia and Kosovo, have
been rapidly reduced, raising the question what impact the withdrawals will have on
the region’s stability.  In December 2004, SFOR’s mission was concluded and the
European Union took over peacekeeping duties in Bosnia.  A few hundred U.S.
troops remain in Bosnia to assist Bosnian defense reforms and fight terrorism.  Large-
scale anti-Serb riots in Kosovo in March 2004 called into question the adequacy of
KFOR and U.N. efforts to promote security and stability in Kosovo.   
Since the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States, the war on terrorism
has been the United States’ main foreign policy priority, including in the Balkans.
Before September 11, Al Qaeda supporters operated from Bosnia and Albania.
However, the Administration has said that these countries and others in the region
have “actively supported” the war on terrorism, shutting down terrorist front
organizations and seizing their assets.  Although their efforts are hampered by the
weakness of local  government institutions, U.S. anti-terrorism efforts in the Balkans
are aided by U.S. military and intelligence assets in the region, as well as a reservoir
of good will among local Muslims of all ethnic groups.  
Congress has played an important role in shaping U.S. Balkans policy. Some
Members supported Clinton Administration efforts to intervene to stop the fighting
in the region, while others were opposed.  Members were leery of an open-ended
commitment to the region, and sought to contain these costs through adoption of
benchmarks and limiting U.S. aid and troop levels to the region to about 15% of the
amounts provided by all countries.  The end of the wars in the Balkans and the shift
in U.S. priorities in the wake of the September 11 attacks has moved the Balkans to
the periphery of Congressional  concerns, at least when compared to the situation in
the 1990s.  However, the 109th Congress may have an important impact in such areas
as conditioning  some U.S. aid to Serbia on cooperation with the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, and contributing to the international
debate on Kosovo’s future status.
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Introduction: Are the Balkans
 Still Important to the United States?
The United States and the international community have achieved substantial
successes in the Balkans since the mid-1990s.  The wars in the former Yugoslavia
have ended, and all of the countries are undertaking political and economic reforms
at home and orienting their foreign policies toward Euro-Atlantic institutions.  Noting
the relative stability of the Balkans at present, some skeptics doubt that the United
States still has vital security interests in the Balkans that warrant the investment of
U.S. forces. Given the increasing strain on U.S. forces due to deployments in
Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere, they argue that the United States should accelerate
the process of turning over responsibility for the region to the Europeans, who have
a greater stake in the region’s stability.   
Advocates of continued U.S. engagement in the Balkans point out that both the
Clinton and Bush Administrations have stated that ensuring the stability of the
Balkans is an important part of a U.S. vital interest in securing a Europe whole, free
and at peace. They say the United States needs to finish the job of consolidating
peace in the Balkans and that a premature U.S. pullout from the region could cause
the current positive trends in the region to unravel.  They note that the United States
has strong political credibility in the region, which the Europeans lack.  In addition,
the region may have a higher strategic profile given possible plans to shift U.S. troops
from Western Europe to new NATO members Romania and Bulgaria, for operations
in the Middle East.  Proponents of continued U.S. engagement also say that a U.S.
presence is needed to uproot terrorist networks in the region. 
Current Challenges in the Region
Political Status Issues
The wars of the 1990s were ostensibly fought over the political status and
borders of the successor states of the former Yugoslavia, and at least two of these
issues remain unresolved.    
Kosovo.  Perhaps the most difficult status issue involves Kosovo.  The future
status of Kosovo will be determined by the U.N. Security Council, as set down in
UNSC Resolution 1244. However, the resolution provides very little detail on the
issue, saying only that Kosovo’s status should be determined by an unspecified
“political process.” UNSC Resolution 1244 explicitly confirms the territorial
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integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (which consisted of Serbia and
neighboring Montenegro) and calls for “substantial autonomy” for Kosovo “within
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.”  The province’s Constitutional Framework, a
constitution imposed by the U.N. Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) after consultation
with local representatives, adds that this political process “shall...take into account
all relevant factors, including the will of the people.”1  
The overwhelming majority of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo (who make up over
90% of the province’s population) favor independence for the province.  The Serbian
minority in Kosovo (under 10% of the population) and the Serbian government want
the province to remain part of Serbia.  Kosovo’s independence is also opposed by
virtually the entire international community, including United States and other
Western countries, as well as by all of Kosovo’s neighbors, except Albania.  They
fear that an independent Kosovo could destabilize the region by encouraging
separatist ethnic Albanian forces in Macedonia, as well as Serbia’s Presevo Valley,
where many ethnic Albanians live.  Some also fear international support for Kosovar
independence could undermine the democratic leadership in Belgrade and strengthen
extreme nationalists.  
The current consensus in the international community on the status issue, as laid
out by UNMIK,  has been dubbed “standards before status.” According to this policy,
Kosovo’s institutions and society must achieve certain standards, including
democratization, the rule of law and respect for ethnic minorities, before the issue of
Kosovo’s final status is discussed.  Kosovar Albanians have expressed opposition to
this approach, which they believe is designed to delay their aspirations for
independence indefinitely.  UNMIK has transferred some of its responsibilities to the
Kosovo government but the Kosovars assert that the Constitutional Framework does
not give them enough authority to achieve the benchmarks, especially in the area of
law and order.
In November 2003, U.S. Under Secretary of State Marc Grossman announced,
with the support of the other members of the international Contact Group (Britain,
France, Germany, Italy, and Russia), a formal review in mid-2005 on Kosovo’s
progress toward meeting the standards.  If in the judgement of the Contact Group, the
U.N. Security Council, and other interested parties, this progress is “sufficient,” a
process to determine the province’s status may begin.
The international policy of “standards before status”was called into question by
widespread ethnic Albanian riots against Serbs in Kosovo on March 17-18, 2004,
the worst inter-ethnic violence since the end of the 1999 Kosovo war.  Ethnic
Albanian crowds attacked several ethnic Serb enclaves as well as international
security forces trying to control the rioters.  Nineteen civilians were killed in the
attacks, more than 900 persons were injured, and over 4,000 were forced from their
homes.  UNMIK also reported that the riots resulted in the destruction of or serious
damage to about 30 churches and monasteries, 800 houses, and 150 vehicles. 
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The March 2004 events underlined both how far Kosovo is from meeting the
standards and the frustration of Kosovo Albanians over what they see as the
temporizing of the international community on the status question.  Observers fear
that this situation, coupled with the exposure of UNMIK and KFOR’s vulnerabilities
during the riots, may set the stage for further explosions in the future.  
In the wake of the March 2004 events, U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan
asked Norwegian diplomat Kai Eide to submit recommendation for future U.N.
policy in Kosovo.  Eide’s report, submitted to the Security Council in August 2004,
said that the standard before status policy “lacks credibility” in the wake of the March
events.  He called for a “dynamic priority-based standards policy.”  The new policy
would focus on making rapid progress in a few key areas (mainly dealing with
ensuring minority rights) with a view toward opening early negotiations on Kosovo’s
status.  Eide claimed such negotiations could not be put off much longer, given ethnic
Albanian frustration over their current poverty and lack of clarity on their future.
Eide also called for a rapid shift of additional competencies from UNMIK to the
Kosovo government.   
However, perhaps reflecting some concerns among many countries in the
Security Council about moving too rapidly on the status issue, Secretary General
Annan responded to the Eide report by saying that the U.N. would continue to
support the “standards before status” policy.  However, Annan did call for focus on
priority areas within the standards and for giving greater powers to the Kosovo
government, as the Eide report suggested.2  UNMIK and the Kosovo government are
working closely to accelerate implementation of the most important standards, while
in early 2005, the Contact Group and the Security Council will provide interim
evaluations of the success of that implementation before the formal review occurs in
the middle of the year.  If the formal review is positive, final status discussions may
begin soon thereafter.  Observers believe that a negative evaluation at the formal
review, or a lengthy delay in opening final status discussions for any other reason,
could lead to a deterioration of relations between the international community and
the Kosovo Albanians, perhaps even to a resumption of violence.
In April 2004, the Serbian parliament approved a “decentralization” plan for
Kosovo.  The plan would set up autonomous Serb regions in northern Kosovo,
similar in some ways to the current division of Bosnia into “entities” under weak
central control.  Under the proposal, Serbian-majority areas in Kosovo would be
controlled by local Serb authorities, with their own police.  Ethnic Albanian
authorities would control the rest of the province, although Serbs in those areas
would have personal and cultural autonomy, and Kosovo as a whole would remain
part of Serbia.  Such a plan would have the benefit, from Belgrade’s point of view,
of consolidating its control over northern Kosovo, where most Serbs remaining in the
province now live, and where important economic assets, such as the Trepca mining
complex, are found.  Ethnic Albanian leaders strongly oppose the Serbian plan for
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these very reasons.  International officials fear such a proposal could spark renewed
violence, particularly in contested areas as Mitrovica, in northern Kosovo.3   
Given the terms of UNSC Resolution 1244, the international community will
play a key role in determining Kosovo’s future.  It could attempt to continue the
current situation (international control, nominal Serbian sovereignty) indefinitely by
maintaining a long-term, if diminishing, military and civilian presence in Kosovo, at
the risk of increasingly alienating the ethnic Albanian population, possibly resulting
in additional violence by ethnic Albanian extremists.  
On the other hand, the international community could hold out the possibility
of independence for Kosovo, conditioned on the achievement of clearly-defined
benchmarks by the Kosovo government within the next few years.  Such a policy
would likely provoke an outcry in Serbia, possibly undermining the position of
democratic leaders there.  However, some Belgrade politicians have reportedly
privately viewed Kosovo as lost to Serbia in the long run, given the overwhelmingly
ethnic Albanian population there.4  It is possible that the prospect of conditional
independence for Kosovo could lead Belgrade to bargain over the terms of that
independence, perhaps asking for autonomy for Serbian-dominated areas of northern
Kosovo, guarantees for the remaining ethnic Serb minority elsewhere in Kosovo, and
compensation for Serbian property in the province.  Possible efforts by Serbian
leaders to call into question the status of the Republika Srpska within Bosnia as part
of a Kosovo deal are likely to be rejected by the international community. In these
circumstances, ethnic Albanians in Kosovo would have to commit themselves to
shutting down extremist groups that could cause instability in southern Serbia and
Macedonia, and to renounce unification with Albania. 
Serbia and Montenegro.  In February 2003, the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia was dissolved and a new, much looser relationship was formed between
its two constituent republics, Serbia and Montenegro.  The new arrangement was
brokered by the European Union in 2002 to head off efforts of Montenegrin leaders
to declare their republic’s independence.  However, the constitutional charter has not
completely eliminated this issue; it permits the parties to secede from the union in
three years. The European Union, supported by the United States, has opposed
Montenegro’s independence because they believe that it could provoke instability in
Montenegro (where polls have shown independence is supported by a slender
majority of about 55%) as well as elsewhere in the region. 
A large part of the concern about Montenegrin independence is the possible
effect on the situation in  Kosovo.  The union’s Constitutional Charter describes
Kosovo as part of Serbia, a provision that has been denounced by Kosovar Albanians.
Kosovar Albanians claim that since the FRY no longer exists, Kosovo can no longer
be considered part of it according to UNSC Resolution 1244, and is therefore free to
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become independent.  Serbia claims that the deal between Serbia and Montenegro
demonstrates international opposition to Kosovo’s independence.5   
The future of the Serbia and Montenegro union is unclear.  One important factor
in determining its fate will be the political climate in Montenegro over the next few
years.  The current leadership, headed by Prime Minister Milo Djukanovic, has based
a substantial part of its public support on its pro-independence stand, arguing that
independence will bring greater prosperity for Montenegro.  This approach gained
credibility during the Milosevic era, due to the fact that many pro-Belgrade forces
were also anti-reform.  However, Djukanovic and his supporters have been tarnished
in the past year by slow progress in reforms and a series of scandals.  Pro-reform
forces could emerge that may downplay the independence issue.  Independence could
also lose favor as an option if the European Union continues to insist on closer
economic links with Serbia as a condition for possible EU membership.6  On the
other hand, if pro-independence forces maintain support and the EU shifts to a less
hostile position on Montenegrin independence (perhaps in the case of a resolution of
the Kosovo status issue), Montenegro could become an independent country as early
as 2006. 
Establishing Democracy and the Rule of Law 
The domestic political situation in the Balkan countries  has improved in recent
years.  All the countries in the region have held largely free and fair elections.  In
Croatia and Serbia, semi-authoritarian nationalist regimes were removed from power
peacefully in 2000. Countries in the region have undertaken efforts to redraw their
constitutions along more democratic lines.  However, serious problems remain.  The
legitimacy of democratic institutions is challenged by the weakness of government
structures, slow progress toward the rule of law, corruption, and organized crime.  As
in other transition countries in Central and Eastern Europe, part of this problem is
due to the Communist heritage of the region.  However, an even more serious
obstacle, particularly in the cases of Bosnia, Serbia and Kosovo, is the power of
political-criminal groups, often associated with war criminals and local security
services.  These groups played a key role in igniting the wars in the Balkans and
became much stronger because of them. In addition to retarding progress in
democratization and the rule of law, these groups also raise ethnic tensions by acts
of violence against minorities and engage in trafficking in persons, drugs and
weapons.7  
The murder of Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic in March 2003 was the
most dramatic example of the seriousness of this threat to the region’s stability.
Although the Serbian government arrested many persons associated with the plot, it
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is not clear that it has dealt fully with the issues of fighting organized crime and
corruption, as well as security services reform. The international community has
moved against such groups in Bosnia and Kosovo, reducing their economic resources
and access to political offices, but they remain powerful.  One of the most important
steps taken by the international community in this regard is the capture and
prosecution of alleged war criminals, although many remain at large.  Failure to bring
war criminals to justice undermines the rule of law and provides a boost to criminals
and nationalist extremists.  However, local courts have made only tentative steps to
take up war crimes cases against persons of their own ethnic groups.8
While the international community has provided large amounts of aid to
strengthen local institutions and the rule of law, it may also itself be responsible for
some of the problems.  Some analysts view the decentralized political system of
Bosnia, a product of post-war political compromise, as unworkable, and advocate the
strengthening of central government institutions.  In both Bosnia and Kosovo,
international officials frequently impose policies from above, perhaps fostering a
culture of dependency and political irresponsibility among local elites.  Given these
problems, the region’s transition to democracy and the rule of law is likely to be
lengthy and difficult.9 
In Bosnia and Kosovo, international officials have pursued a policy of
intensifying reforms from above in the short run, in order to lay the basis for local
leaders to continue them as the international role declines.  However, it is unclear
whether these reforms will have a sufficient political constituency to maintain their
momentum when international forces are pulled out.  As in the case of the countries
of the former Soviet bloc, where reforms have unfolded slowly and inconsistently,
there appear to be no easy answers to these issues.  The international community may
need to continue to provide conditional assistance for reforms and the perspective of
integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions if it wants to encourage a stable, long-term
political consensus for reform.    
Economic Reform and Improving Living Standards 
The economies of the region face the double burden of a Communist legacy as
well as  well as continued resistance to reforms and economic transparency by local
leaders.  Some of the region’s economic problems are closely related to its political
problems.  Weak and corrupt state structures have been an obstacle to rationalizing
tax and customs systems to provide adequate revenue for social programs and other
government functions. The absence of the rule of law has hampered foreign
investment in some countries due to a lack of transparency in the privatization
process and concern over the sanctity of contracts.  In Bosnia, the presence of two
“entities” has hindered the development of a single market in that country.
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Privatization in Kosovo has been slowed by uncertainty over ownership of assets,
which is a reflection of uncertainty over the province’s future status.10
Substantial progress has been made in economic reforms in some countries,
particularly in Croatia and Serbia.  Fiscal and monetary austerity, with the assistance
of international financial institutions, has permitted many countries to reduce
inflation and stabilize their currencies.  Serbia has embarked on rapid privatization
of its industries and begun to reform its weak banking sector, a common problem in
the region.   However, many companies in the region are in poor shape, in part due
to mismanagement by former Communist and nationalist regimes.  Painful decisions
have to be made to shutter uncompetitive companies, which would aggravate an
already severe problem of unemployment.  For example, unemployment in Bosnia
is over 40% and in Kosovo is around 50%, although the presence of the informal
economy probably means that this is an overstatement.11 A particularly vulnerable
group, especially in Bosnia and Serbia, is the large population of refugees and
displaced persons.  Refugees who return to their homes face economic problems of
their own, such as a lack of jobs and social services.  This has meant that a
substantial proportion of those who have returned are older persons living on a
pension.  
Declining international assistance to the Balkans has had a negative impact on
the economies of the region, particularly in Bosnia and Kosovo.  These economies
have been highly dependent not only on aid itself, but on the spending of
international officials and organizations in the region.  Although positive signs have
emerged in recent years,  the economic challenges faced by the countries of the
region mean that a decade or more could be required before the poorer countries
approach living standards closer to those of EU countries.  As in the case of political
reform, which is closely linked to successful economic reform, a long-term
international commitment of aid and advice may be required to build and maintain
a local consensus for often painful measures.  Perhaps an even greater stimulus to
reform in these countries could be the prospect of increased foreign investment. 
U.S. Policy Concerns
Creating Self-Sustaining Stability in the Balkans 
The current goal of the United States and the international community in the
Balkans is to stabilize the region in a way that is self-sustaining and does not require
direct intervention by NATO-led forces and international civilian officials. In the
longer term, the goal is to integrate them more fully into Euro-Atlantic institutions.
Many in the United States and Europe are seeking to give the European Union a
greater role in the region, with a correspondingly smaller role by the United States,
CRS-8
12 Judy Dempsey, Stephen Fidler and Peter Spiegel, “Pentagon Urged to Pull Out of
Balkans,” Financial Times,  September 17, 2003, 10.
13 Niels C. Sorrells and Colin Clark, “Undermanned and Overdeployed? Congress Debates
Expanded Army, Congressional Quarterly Weekly, August 2, 2003, p. 1978.
14 For more information, see CRS Report RS21774, Bosnia and International Security
Forces: Transition from NATO to the European Union, by Julie Kim. 
at least as far as troop levels and aid are concerned.  These goals have been given
greater urgency by competing U.S. and international priorities that have emerged
since September 11, 2001, such as the war on terrorism, and efforts to stabilize Iraq
and Afghanistan, which have placed strains on U.S. resources.  
Some senior U.S. Army officers have reportedly been concerned that their forces
are overstretched and have sought the withdrawal U.S. troops in the Balkans as part
of a global review of U.S. deployments.12  Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen.
Richard Myers said in September 2003 that a troop withdrawal from the Balkans was
an option “on the table,” but that the United States would not withdraw its forces
without consulting its European allies.  Since taking office in 2001, the
Administration has stressed that the U.S. peacekeeping forces went into the Balkans
with the Europeans, and would leave together with them.
Although  about 2,000 U.S. troops are currently deployed in the Balkans, experts
estimate that three times as many troops are affected by the deployment, including
those who are about to rotate into an assignment and retraining for troops who have
rotated out.  Moreover, constant deployments throughout the world may have a
negative impact on re-enlistment throughout the U.S. military, including in the
National Guard units that now play a key role in U.S. deployments to the Balkans.
One alternative to a pullout from the Balkans and other deployments, an increase in
the total size of the U.S. Army, has been resisted by the Administration.13
Reducing and Replacing SFOR and KFOR.  There are currently about
7,000 European Union troops in Bosnia and 17,500 NATO-led troops in KFOR in
Kosovo.  There are currently about 100-200 U.S. troops in Bosnia and about 1,800
in KFOR in Kosovo.   The reduction of SFOR and KFOR raises the question of
whether these forces are still able to provide genuine security, particularly since the
March 2004 riots in Kosovo. 
EU takeover of the Bosnia Mission.   In December 2004, the SFOR’s
mission came to an end, and peacekeeping duties have been handed over to a
European Union force of about 7,000 troops.  The EU force is tasked with helping
to maintain a secure environment in Bosnia and support Bosnia’s progress toward
integration with the EU.  NATO continues to have a headquarters presence in
Sarajevo, with a residual U.S. force presence of 100-200 troops.  The NATO
presence continues to assist in efforts to promote defense reforms, combat terrorism,
and assist the capture of persons indicted for war crimes.14
Although the situation in Bosnia is largely stable, some observers are concerned
about the ability of the EU to act effectively without the United States.  One concern
is Europe’s political credibility in the region, particularly when dealing with the
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possible use of force.  Observers say that the rivalries and internal divisions among
European countries sometimes delay decisions and permit local actors to play some
countries against others.15  Perhaps most importantly, the United States has special
credibility with the Bosniaks, given the U.S. role in helping them to combat what
they viewed as Serb aggression in the early 1990s, while the Europeans were
perceived as reluctant to choose sides or use force to end their suffering.  
Filling a Possible Security Gap.  Another concern facing both Balkan
deployments is who, if anyone, will fulfill the tasks that they are currently performing
as military forces are withdrawn.  One important issue is policing.  Formally, SFOR
and KFOR do not play a direct role in policing duties in Bosnia and Kosovo.
However, they do provide “area security” by regular patrolling.  In Bosnia, policing
is the responsibility of local authorities, with EU monitoring and training.  Experts
say that the Europeans have policing capabilities that the United States lacks, such
as the paramilitary forces that have operated in Bosnia and Kosovo for many years.
France has proposed the establishment of an EU gendarmerie force to take part in
such missions in the Balkans and elsewhere.16  Some analysts advocate a more robust
mission for EU police in Bosnia, giving them the power to make arrests and use
force, in order to fight organized crime.  High Representative Paddy Ashdown, the
leading international official in Bosnia, has attempted to push through reforms to
reduce the control of the semi-autonomous “entities” within Bosnia over the police,
provoking strong oppositions from the Republika Srpska, the largely Serb entity.
The March 2004 riots in Kosovo exposed serious weaknesses in policing and
security in Kosovo.  With notable exceptions, the local Kosovo Police Service did
not perform very well, sometimes melting away in the face of the rioters and in a few
cases joining them. CIVPOL, the U.N. police contingent in Kosovo, was hampered
by a lack of cohesion and leadership.  There were many reports of KFOR troops,
outnumbered by the rioters and unwilling to fire on them, refusing to intervene to
stop the destruction and looting of property.  Some KFOR units reportedly failed
even to protect Serb civilians and U.N. police from violence.17  After the riots, KFOR
officers say they have taken steps to deal with these problems, including by
establishing clearer lines of authority and consistent rules of engagement. 
SFOR and KFOR have also played important roles in overseeing the military
forces of Bosnia and Kosovo.  SFOR inspected the military arsenals of Bosnia’s two
armies, uncovers illegal weapons caches, and oversees the promotions of senior
officers of the Bosnian Serb and Federation armies.  SFOR and the Office of the
High Representative worked together to reform the two Bosnian armies and reduce
them in size.  These reforms include the unification of Bosnia’s two armies under a
single command structure, including a Minister of Defense and Chief of Staff.
However, the armies would remain separate at lower levels.  NATO has set a united
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command as a key condition for permitting Bosnia and Hercegovina to join the
Partnership for Peace program. Bosnia must also cooperate fully with the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.18
KFOR monitors the Kosovo Protection Corps, which was formed in 1999 from
the Kosovo Liberation Army.  Although ostensibly meant to deal with civil
emergencies, the KPC is seen by many of its members and many Kosovar Albanians
as the nucleus of a future army of an independent Kosovo.  In addition to overseeing
the KPC,  KFOR also monitors Kosovo’s borders to ensure ethnic Albanian
guerrillas do not use Kosovo as a springboard to destabilize neighboring countries,
and that Serbian military forces stay out of the province.   KFOR played an important
role in forcing the dissolution of an ethnic Albanian guerrilla force in southern Serbia
in 2000.  However, members of the KPC played leading roles in an ethnic Albanian
revolt against the Macedonian government.  Although the conflict in Macedonia
ended in 2001 after talks brokered by the EU and United States, a shadowy ethnic
Albanian group calling itself the “Albanian National Army” continues to commit
scattered acts of violence in Kosovo, southern Serbia and Macedonia with the alleged
objective of uniting all ethnic Albanian lands. 
In addition to hampering efforts by ethnic Albanian extremists to destabilize
neighboring countries, KFOR’s presence also deters possible Serbian aggression or
military provocations against Kosovo, although an invasion of Kosovo by Serbian
troops is unlikely to occur under the current pro-Western government in Belgrade.
Nevertheless, escalation over flashpoints, such as Mitrovica, is possible.  The danger
could be increased if the ultranationalist Radical Party comes to power in Serbia.
Given these concerns, the stabilizing presence of KFOR may be needed until there
is a mutually accepted determination of Kosovo’s status.
Reorganizing the International Civilian Presence in the Region.
Another issue, closely linked to SFOR and KFOR’s future, is how to reorganize the
international civilian presence in the region.  Some experts suggest that ad hoc
arrangements cobbled together at the end of the conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo,
under which local authorities are supervised and sometimes overruled by
international bureaucracies, should be phased out. They believe that the two main
forces for Euro-Atlantic integration, the European Union and NATO, should have a
clear leading role in the region, but through advice and aid, not direct rule.  In the
EU, this takes the form of the Stabilization and Association process, and perhaps in
the more distant future, accession to the EU.  
At present, only Croatia and Macedonia have Stabilization and Association
agreements. Kosovo cannot participate in the SAA process because it is deemed to
be part of Serbia.  NATO’s role would take place mainly through PFP and in the
longer term, the Membership Action Plan process, as has already occurred in the case
of Croatia.  Responsibilities for prosecuting war crimes would shift from the ICTY
to local courts, especially after the two most notorious indictees, former Bosnian Serb
leader Radovan Karadzic and former Bosnian Serb army chief Ratko Mladic are
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turned over to the Tribunal.  U.N. Security Council Resolution 1503 calls for the
ICTY to complete its investigations by 2004, its trials by 2008 and all appeals by
2010.  In Bosnia, High Representative Ashdown has worked with the ICTY to create
a new war crimes court to try future war crimes cases within Bosnia.  The United
States and other countries assisted Serbia’s efforts to set up their own war crimes
court.
Under this scenario, the United States would gradually play a smaller role in the
region over time, acting largely through NATO and providing bilateral aid in selected
areas, such as reform of intelligence and internal security bodies, military reform and
rule of law assistance.  However, the prestige and credibility that the United States
has in the region will likely still be needed to exercise leadership in resolving some
of the most difficult issues, such as the arrest of war criminals and the status of
Kosovo.19  
One problem with reducing the direct role of the international community  in the
region is a familiar one: the dilemma of either imposing the policies that it wants on
local figures, or accepting local solutions that are often incompatible with
international goals.  One possible solution advocated by some experts is a burst of
increased activism by the international community in the short run, for example to
capture war criminals and break the power of organized crime, in order to prepare the
way for a reduction in the direct international role later.  To some extent, this is
occurring already, for example in Bosnia, where High Representative Paddy
Ashdown has imposed changes to laws in order  to strengthen the central Bosnian
state at the expense of the entities.  However, it remains to be seen what staying
powers these changes will have if they are not backed by local political forces when
OHR’s role in Bosnia ends, even when backed by aid conditionality. Similar
questions may be asked of UNMIK’s policies in Kosovo, particular since UNMIK
is turning over more of its tasks to the local Kosovo government.
Resolving the Status of Kosovo. The future of the international presence
in Kosovo is closely related to the future status of the province. The international
community is increasingly preoccupied with other global challenges, and may seek
to move forward on the issue of a final settlement in order to begin to wind down the
international presence in Kosovo.  Some experts believe that the Kosovo status issue
cannot be postponed  to an indefinite future. They believe that it is unrealistic to try
to ignore  the clearly expressed desire of the overwhelming majority of the
population of Kosovo on the issue.   They are also concerned that failure to clarify
the issue could strengthen the hand of ethnic Albanian extremists, perhaps leading
to an increase in violence.  Some Kosovars claim that continued uncertainty over
Kosovo’s ultimate future has had a negative impact on such issues as privatization
and attracting foreign investment.   
Some experts call for  negotiations on status in the near future.  In January 2005,
the International Crisis Group produced a report advocating the opening of talks on
Kosovo’s final status in 2005. The report considers “conditional independence” as
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a possible outcome.  It suggests that Kosovo should receive independence in
exchange for pledges from Kosovo to rule out the establishment of a greater Albania
and to respect the rights of ethnic minorities.  It calls for a Kosovo constitution to be
drawn up as part of the status talks that would provide for oversight by international
bodies and the continued participation of international judges in Kosovo’s legal
system.20 
Some observers believe that the U.S. may have to play a leadership role in
dealing with Kosovo, not only because of its role as the world’s leading power, and
therefore more able to act more decisively than the EU, but also because it is the only
country that ethnic Albanians in Kosovo trust.  The United States played the key role
in establishing the mid-2005 review date for Kosovo’s progress toward the standards.
U.S. and International Aid in the Balkans
Since the end of the wars in the region, U.S. aid has gradually declined, in part
due to a natural shift from humanitarian aid to technical assistance and partly due to
a focus on assistance to other regions of the world.  U.S. bilateral assistance
appropriated under the SEED Act (which now almost exclusively focuses on Balkan
countries) fell from $621 million in FY2002, to $442 million in FY2004, to an
estimated $393 million in FY2005. The Administration requested $382 million in
SEED assistance for FY2006.21  
Given increasingly constrained resources, the Administration’s assistance
strategy is focused on programs to create effective governance, bolster civil society,
and promote entrepreneurship.  This assistance includes strengthening political
parties, judicial systems and non-governmental organizations, and aid to small
businesses. Security services reform is also critical, as these organizations are seen
to harbor hardliners who impede the rule of law.   Although modest when compared
to EU and other sources, some observers say that U.S. aid has been useful, because
of its relatively quick and efficient delivery, and also because of the contacts it
promotes between professionals in such fields as political party-building and NGO
development.22  
U.S. bilateral aid plays a lesser role in assisting macroeconomic reforms,
restructuring local industries and the banking sector, and rebuilding infrastructure,
although the United States provides important advice in these areas through technical
assistance programs.  Most funding for these functions  are performed by
international financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, World
Bank, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.  U.S. officials
see the EU as playing the leading role in providing assistance to reform these
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countries along EU lines, perhaps eventually leading to EU membership.  As these
countries move closer to EU standards, the more advanced countries could
“graduate” from U.S. assistance.23
Some U.S. and European experts have criticized what they view as a lack of
vision by the EU in its policy toward the region.  Under its aid program for the
region,  EU has allotted 4.65 billion Euro ($5.95 billion, at current exchange rates)
from 2000-2006.   However, aid has decreased significantly over the past few years,
from 805 million Euro in 2001 ($1.03 billion) to 548 million Euro ($701 million) in
2004.24  Skeptics of EU policy say this decrease in resources appears at odds with
commitments made at the June 2003 Thessaloniki EU summit with the countries of
the Western Balkans.  At the summit, EU leaders recognized the countries of the
region as prospective EU members.   Critics point to generous EU pre-accession aid
given to Central European countries and to neighboring Bulgaria and Romania as a
model, saying more extensive aid could help the Balkan countries restructure their
economies and legal systems more quickly to meet EU conditions for membership,
while bringing local living standards somewhat closer to EU standards.25  
Regional leaders, particularly those from countries with ambitions for early EU
membership such as Croatia and Serbia, were disappointed with the results of the
summit, saying that the lack of a clear road map for their possible admission to the
EU would make it harder for them to secure the necessary domestic consensus
needed to move reforms forward.  Skeptics may argue that EU membership is such
a distant goal for these countries that a timetable for membership would be little more
than an empty gesture.  After all, it has taken more than 12 years from the fall of
communism until the present for the more advanced countries of Central Europe to
reach the brink of EU membership.  With the possible exception of Croatia, the
countries of the region may have to wait similarly long periods for possible
membership.  However, it is possible that  increased funding and advice that would
come with pre-accession status could make a substantial difference in the progress
of the region.
EU officials say current aid levels to these countries are adequate, and that
progress toward membership lies mainly in the hands of the countries themselves.
They also point to the “European Integration Partnerships” program adopted at the
summit. These partnerships, modeled on similar assistance provided to the pre-
accession countries, are designed to provide better tailored advice to the countries of
the region.26  EU countries have a substantial interest in the stability of the Balkans.
The region’s problems already have a substantial impact on EU countries, in such
areas as trafficking in drugs and persons. The effect could be considerably worse if
the region deteriorates into chaos and conflict.   However, it is possible that the EU’s
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other problems, such as managing the wave of new members in 2004, adopting a new
constitution, and budgetary pressures faced by key member states, may make
providing additional resources for the Balkans difficult.   
The War on Terrorism and the Balkans
Since the September 11 attacks on the United States, the war on terrorism has
been the United States’ main foreign policy priority and has had an impact on U.S.
policy in the Balkans.  Bosnia has been a significant  haven for Al Qaeda and other
terrorist groups in the Balkans, due to their participation in the Bosnian war of 1992-
1995.  A small number of Muslim fundamentalist fighters fought for the Bosniak
(Bosnian Muslim) army during the war.  Most left Bosnia at U.S. insistence after the
deployment of IFOR (later SFOR) in December 1995.  A few stayed, and become
Bosnian citizens by marrying local women.  Al Qaeda ties with several Islamic
charities and humanitarian organizations proliferated in Bosnia during and after the
war.  Some Al Qaeda operatives in Bosnia reportedly have connections to members
of Bosnia’s intelligence service, a legacy of Bosniak wartime cooperation with
Islamic militants.  Terrorist groups have also operated from Albania. There have been
few reports of terrorists operating from Kosovo.27 It should be stressed that
opposition to terrorism among Muslims in the Balkans has been remarkably strong.
Bosniak, Albanian and Kosovar Albanian Muslims are generally more secular in
outlook than Muslims elsewhere.  Most view themselves as part of Europe and are
grateful for the perceived U.S. role in defending them against Serbian aggression.
Efforts by Islamic extremists to recruit local Muslims into their organizations have
met with limited success.28   
The 2003 State Department Patterns of Global Terrorism report notes that
“despite limited resources, the countries of southeast Europe have actively supported
the international Coalition against terrorism. Albania, Serbia-Montenegro, Bosnia
and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Bulgaria cooperated to combat organized crime and
various forms of trafficking, enhance border security, and improve training for border
security personnel.”  The report says that Bosnia has shut down non-governmental
organizations with links to terrorism and has frozen terrorist assets.  Albania has
taken similar steps.  Bosnia has arrested and transferred several terrorist suspects to
U.S. control.  However, local  efforts to fight terrorism are sometimes hampered by
the weakness of government institutions.  On the other hand, the presence of SFOR
and KFOR also provide important resources for anti-terrorist efforts in the region.
NATO troops and intelligence services work with their local counterparts and
independently to track down and arrest suspected terrorists.
Perhaps as important as the threat of Muslim extremists in the Balkans is the
high level of corruption and organized crime in the region, often connected with the
security structures of the countries involved.  One of the most serious incidents
affecting U.S. interests in the region was posed by the sale of arms to Iraq by Bosnian
Serb and Serbian firms, uncovered in 2002.  U.S. assistance to promote the rule of
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law and fight corruption and organized crime may not only boost the long-term
stability of the region, but may prove to be a important component of the effort to
fight terrorism, drugs, trafficking in persons, and other threats to U.S. interests in the
region.
The Role of Congress in U.S. Balkans Policy
Congress has played an important role in shaping U.S. Balkans policy.
Members of Congress spoke out strongly against atrocities by Serbian forces in
Croatia and Bosnia in the early 1990s.  Some Members pushed for lifting the arms
embargo against the Bosniaks, so that they could better defend themselves.
Congressional pressure may have encouraged the Clinton Administration to play a
bigger role in stopping the fighting in Bosnia, ultimately culminating in the Dayton
Peace Accords in 1995. Congress also played an important role in supporting the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and pressing for the arrest
and transfer of indictees.
Despite the activism of some Members on these issues, many in Congress
remained cautious about U.S. military involvement in the Balkans.  The deployment
of U.S. peacekeepers in Bosnia in 1995 and the air war in Kosovo in 1999 provoked
heated debate in Congress, in part due to policy disagreements, in part due to partisan
conflict between the Clinton Administration and a Republican-led Congress.
However, despite sometimes harsh criticism, both military missions received full
congressional funding. Nevertheless, concerns about the costs of open-ended
missions led Congress to try several strategies to limit these uncertainties.  These
included pushing the Administration to set benchmarks for the deployments and to
report on them.  Congress also sought to limit U.S. engagement by pushing for
greater burdensharing.  As a result of legislation and congressional pressure, the U.S.
aid and troop contributions in Bosnia and Kosovo have been capped at no more than
15% of the total contributions of all countries.
The end of the wars in the Balkans and the shift in U.S. priorities in the wake
of the September 11 attacks have moved the Balkans to the periphery of
congressional  concerns, at least when compared to the situation in the 1990s.
However, Congress continues to have an important impact in several areas. Foreign
operations appropriations bills have made modest reductions in SEED funding cuts
proposed by the President, and have shown particular support for aid to Montenegro,
in recognition of that republic’s resistance to the Milosevic regime until the Serbian
leader’s ouster in 2000.   
Congress has also played a critical role in helping to bring Serbian war criminals
to justice. Since 2000, Congress has included provisions in foreign operations
appropriations bills that attached conditions to U.S. aid to Serbia, requiring
cooperation with the war crimes tribunal, ending support to Bosnian Serb structures,
and respect for minority rights.  The FY2005 foreign aid appropriations bill, part of
an omnibus appropriations bill (P.L.108-447), also contains the aid conditions. The
measure specifically calls for Ratko Mladic to be transferred to the tribunal.  It can
be argued that these provisions were a key catalyst for Milosevic’s transfer to The
Hague in 2001, as well as the transfer of many others since then. However,  the fear
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of suspected war criminals that they would be turned over to the Tribunal to comply
with the aid criteria may have led to the murder of Prime Minister Djindjic in March
2003.   A backlash against U.S. pressure to cooperate with the Tribunal may have
also helped the ultranationalist Radical Party become the largest party in the Serbian
parliament after December 2003 elections in Serbia.29   The Radicals were excluded
from the Serbian government formed after the election, but the current, weak
coalition government in Serbia has a poor record of cooperation with the Tribunal,
according to U.S. officials, resulting in cuts in U.S. aid to Serbia.   It is possible that
the 109th Congress will also take up the aid conditionality issue.
Another Balkan issue on which some Members  focused in the 108th Congress
is the status of Kosovo.  Several House and Senate resolutions (H.Res. 11, H.Res. 28,
and S.Res. 144) were introduced that dealt with the issue, some of them supporting
independence for Kosovo.  However, while some Members have strongly favored
Kosovo’s independence, others have been leery of taking steps that they believe
could destabilize the region or run counter to Administration policy, which opposes
determining Kosovo’s status at this time.  H.Res. 28 was discussed at a House
International Relations Committee hearing on Kosovo’s future in May 2003 and at
a markup session on the resolution in October 2004, but was not voted on by the
Committee and did not receive floor consideration in the 108th Congress.
In the wake of the March 2004 violence in Kosovo, several resolutions were
introduced to condemn the attacks as well as subsequent attacks on Islamic sites in
Serbia.  These included H.Res. 587, introduced by Representative Christopher Smith
and H.Res. 596, introduced by Representative Burton.  On April 8, the Senate agreed
by unanimous consent to S.Res. 326, introduced by Senator Voinovich.  The
resolution, a slightly modified companion version of H.Res. 596, strongly
condemned the violence; recognized the commitment of Kosovo and Serbian leaders
to rebuild what had been destroyed and encourage the return of refugees; called on
leaders in Kosovo to renounce violence and build a multi-ethnic society based on the
standards for Kosovo; recommended the restructuring of UNMIK; and urged the
reinvigoration of dialogue between Kosovo and Belgrade.  The resolutions note U.S.
and international support for the “standards before status” policy.
The 109th Congress may also take up the issue of Kosovo’s status.  On January
4, 2005, Representative Tom Lantos introduced H.Res. 24, which expresses the sense
of the House that the United States should support Kosovo’s independence.
